Pelham In Court

Pelham In Court

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Jackson, ex dem. Pell v. Prevost, 2 Cai. R. 164 (N.Y. Aug. Term 1804). This case illustrates the sorts of legal battles that arose from the law enacted on October 22, 1779 providing that the lands and properties of persons deemed "adhering to enemies of this state" (i.e., British Loyalists during the Revolutionary War) would be forfeited to the State which could then sell the properties free and clear of any claim of title by the Loyalist or the Loyalist's heirs and assigns.

According to the opinion of the Court, at a court of general sessions of the peace held for the County of Westchester on November 10, 1780, an "indictment" was found against Joshua Pell, the owner of properties in the "manor of Pelham". After the indictment, but before default judgment against Joshua Pell was signed on July 15, 1783, title to the lands passed from Joshua Pell to Joshua Pell, Jr. After the default judgment of forfeiture was finalized on July 15, 1783, New York State conveyed title to the lands to the defendant in the case, Mr. Prevost.

Joshua Pell, Jr. later leased the properties to the plaintiff, Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson, claiming a leasehold interest in the property, sued Mr. Prevost seeking control of the property on the grounds that he was rightful tenant entitled to possess the property and alleging that the original indictment was against Joshua Pell (i.e., Joshua Pell, Sr.) -- not Joshua Pell, Jr. -- and that no proper indictment had ever been found against Joshua Pell, Jr. The Court rejected the argument, saying that Joshua Pell, Jr. was given notice "to appear and traverse the indictment" but he chose not to do so. The Court further noted that in the Court below there was a finding by special verdict that Joshua Pell, Jr. was "the person intended" in the indictment and the mere omission of "Jr." after his name was not enough to void the process. According to the Court, Joshua Pell, Jr. "should have appeared and traversed the indictment, and then made the objection. It is now too late." Finally, the Court found that the procedures required by the forfeiture statute had been met because Joshua Pell, Jr. held title to the property at the time the default judgment of forfeiture was rendered. According to the Court, the statute "declares the forfeiture to attach upon all the estate which the person had at the time of conviction" (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court entered judgment for Mr. Prevost, the defendant, on the grounds that Joshua Pell, Jr. did not have any interest in the property that he had leased to Mr. Jackson, the plaintiff in the case.

Rogers and others, Executors of Henderson v. Ross, Executrix of Ross, 4 Johns. Ch. 388, 8 Am. Dec. 575 (N.Y. Ch. 1820). This soap opera in the guise of a dispute over a will revolved around who was entitled to the rents and profits of "a valuable farm at Pelham, in the county of West Chester" (emphasis in original). It seems that poor William Henderson died and left "all the residue of his estate, both real and personal," to his 17-year-old son, Alexander Henderson "when he should arrive at the age of twenty-three years". William Henderson's friend, Robert Ross, was named among the executors of the Will. Ross handled the estate.

According to the decision, young Alexander Henderson made it to the age of 23 and became the owner of the Pelham farmstead, but died some time after that. The Court held that the executor of the estate of Alexander Henderson, long-time owner of Henderson’s Island (later known as Hunter’s Island) must give an accounting for the rents and profits of the Henderson lands held by the executor after Alexander Henderson’s death but before his illegitimate son, William Henderson, reached the age of majority to receive the estate granted in his father’s will.

The Martha Anne, Olcott 18, 16 F. Cas. 868, No. 9146 (S.D.N.Y. 1843). Under admiralty law, a Pelham oysterman whose sloop was chased out of Oyster Bay and into Long Island Sound where it was seized by Town Officials of Oyster Bay, L.I. who had commandeered another sloop can recover damages and his costs against the sloop used to seize his sloop unlawfully.

Elias D. Hunter v. John Hunter, Jr., Elizabeth D. Hunter, Adele Hunter and Elias D. Hunter, Jr., 17 Barb. 25 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1853). Court construes provisions of last will and testament of John Hunter and indicates proper disposition of such estate property as Hunter’s Island, Hart Island and much more. The opinion contains a wealth of genealogical information about John Hunter and his family.

Thatcher v. Dusenbury, et al., 9 How. Pr. 32 (1854). Court of equity rejects Pelham taxpayer’s request to relieve him of taxes levied to improve roads in Pelham by declaring the assessment and levying proceedings void and by restraining the collection of such taxes. Court dismisses action against the Town’s road commissioners.

John Hunter v. Elias D. Hunter, 19 Barb. 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1855). Grandson of John Hunter sued a son of John Hunter. Both were named as executors of John Hunter’s will. The grandson had not taken upon himself the execution of the will and had not been issued letters testamentary. He sought to establish that certain securities had been given to him via valid assignments by John Hunter during John Hunter’s lifetime and, thus, were valid gifts that belonged to him rather than to John Hunter’s estate. The Court held that all the requirements of a valid gift had been established and that the grandson was entitled, among other things, to a decree or judgment establishing his right to the securities.

United States v. Wilson, 3 Blatchf. 435, 28 F.Cas. 718, No. 16,731 (S.D.N.Y. 1856). George Wilson committed one of the most heinous crimes ever performed in Pelham when he killed the captain of the Schooner Eudora Imogene and scuttled the ship between City Island and Hart Island. In this decision the court dismissed a federal indictment charging Wilson with destroying a vessel on the high seas, holding that because it occurred within the Town of Pelham, it did not fall within the federal statute punishing destruction of a ship on the high seas.

Randall v. The Zebra, 20 F. Cas. 241 (Cir. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 1861). Following a collision between two ships named the Planet and Zebra off the southern point of Hart Island. The owner of the Planet sued The Zebra in libel. The Court below dismissed the action. The Court affirmed, noting that there was evidence below supporting the proposition that the two ships approached each other in nearly opposite directions. Thus, it was not clear which ship was at fault.

Mahler v. The Nowich & N. Y. Transportation Co., 30 How. Pr. 237, 45 Bar. 226 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1865). Plaintiff was the widow of a man killed near Execution Light off the coast of City Island when the sloop on which he sailed, Three Sisters, was struck by the defendants’ steamboat “City of Boston”. Plaintiff sought damages for the death of her husband based on two New York statutes, but the Court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that Long Island Sound was not within the Court’s jurisdiction but, rather, was the high seas and, thus, was governed by the law of nations.

The Joshua Leviness, 9 Ben. 339, 13 F. Cas. 1155 (E.D.N.Y. 1878). This was a proceeding to enforce statutory fines against the steamboat Joshua Leviness for violating navigation laws by sailing before her hull and boiler had been properly inspected. The hull of the ship was built at City Island in September, 1876 and was moved “through the canals” to Norfolk, Virginia where its steam engine was installed. The ship then returned to City Island to be completed, stopping in New York along the way. After her return to City Island a “verbal application” was made for an inspection to which a response was made that there could be no inspection until the ship was completed and the inspection would have to be in New York. While carpenters continued to work on the ship, it was moved to New York for inspection. The court held that moving the unfinished vessel for construction and inspection purposes did not constitute navigation within the meaning of the applicable statute and, thus, the case was dismissed and no fine was required to be paid.

The Two Marys, 10 Ben. 558, 24 F. Cas. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1879). John P. Hawkins was reconstructing the ship The Two Marys at his dock on City Island. A man named David W. McLean commenced a libel against the ship for supplies and materials he had furnished to the ship. The Marshall attached the ship at Hawkins’ Dock. Hawkins came forward claiming a common law lien against the ship and provided a bond for twice the amount of McLean’s claim as required by statute. A dispute arose as to who possessed and should possess the ship upon dissolution of the attachment. The Court held that on dissolution of an attachment against a vessel, it should be returned to the person who was in possession at the time when she was taken under process. In the case of conflicting claims the marshal should not deliver the ship without the order of the court.

Mack v. People of the State of New York, 37 Sickels 235, 82 N. Y. 235, 1880 WL 12551 (N.Y. 1880). Plaintiff committed a burglary on City Island and was caught with the loot in New York City. He was tried and convicted of burglary in New York City. Seeking reversal, he argued on appeal that his constitutional rights had been violated because the indictment and trial occurred in New York County rather than in Westchester County where he committed the crime. The intermediate appellate court rejected his contentions and affirmed his conviction. The New York Court of Appeals likewise affirmed his conviction.

The Town of Pelham v. The Schooner B. F. Woolsey, 3 F. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1880). Federal court holds that a state court had no jurisdiction in an action brought by Pelham to direct the sale of a vessel left at a town dock at City Island for the purpose of enforcing the plaintiff’s lien. Federal Courts have exclusive jurisdiction under maritime law to address such circumstances. Court also resolves claims of two parties each claiming to be owner of the vessel, finding for Daniel H. Terrell in this regard.

Terrell v. The Schooner B. F. Woolsey, 18 Blatchf. 344, 4 F. 552 (Cir. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 1880). Appeal from that portion of decision resolving claims of two parties each claiming to be owner of the vessel after lower court ruled that Daniel H. Terrell was the owner entitled to defend a claim in rem for wages allegedly due a mariner on board the vessel. The other party, John P. Hawkins, sought reversal arguing that he was the owner of the vessel. The court affirms the decision of the lower court.

The B. F. Woolsey, 7 F. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1881). Court holds that Pelham shipwright who was not paid for work and arranged through state court a seizure and sale of ship subsequently determined to be unlawful did not, by such acts, extinguish the lien he held on the vessel to secure payment for the work he performed.

The Two Marys, 10 F. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1882). City Island shipwright John P. Hawkins claimed a common law lien against the ship The Two Marys to secure the money owed him for performing repairs on the ship. The ship master and part owner claimed that he had possession of the ship at the time it was “arrested” in connection with the claims of another libellant and Hawkins sought to intervene in that proceeding to ensure that he would be paid for his work. Following a reference by the court to the clerk for a report, the Court considered the matter and ruled that “Hawkins, at the time of the arrest of the vessel, had such a possessory lien as should be recognized and protected in admiralty; that it had not been waived, and that he must therefore be admitted to intervene as a claimant”.

Higgins v. Higgins, 30 Hun. 84, 14 Abb. N. Cas. 13 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1883). Court orders new trial in case in which separated husband and wife dispute whether property bought by wife with money provided by husband was to be bought solely in husband’s name or in husband’s and wife’s names. Opinion notes that husband also owns land in Pelham.

Town of Pelham v. The B. F. Woolsey, 16 F. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). Town sought wharfage for time schooner was docked at Town Dock on City Island, but the owner of the ship contested the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to which the Town sought wharfage. Court finds statute constitutional, but holds that Town miscalculated wharfage fees under its own regulations and awards substantially reduced amount. (Provides history of statute authorizing Pelham to issue bonds and build Town dock and describes wharf.)

In the Matter of James H. Bailey, Receiver, etc. of the Pelham and Portchester R.R. Co., 4 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 140, 66 How. Pr. 64 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1883). Receiver for the Pelham and Portchester Railroad Company not entitled to return of money that attorney who represented the company retained from a judgment in favor of the company while he represented it immediately before receivership on the grounds that he had a proper lien against the executed judgment for his services rendered.

In re Mayor, etc., to Acquire Public Parks, 54 Sickels 569, 99 N.Y. 569, 2 N.E. 642 (N.Y. 1885). Court upholds constitutionality of statute authorizing the taking of lands for parks northeast of New York City including Pelham Bay Park and finds that the taking of lands outside the City’s boundaries for use as parks constitutes a “city purpose” within the meaning of the authorizing statute.

Town of Pelham v. The Geo. E. Berry, 25 F. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1885). Town of Pelham sought wharfage fees from John P. Hawkins, a City Island shipwright. After The Geo. E. Berry, then known as the Bowdoin, caught fire and burned, the shipwright worked to salvage from her at his shipyard next to the Town Dock. The Town sought the fees for 35 days, but the Court awarded about half that saying the Town’s wharfage ordinance seemed to apply only to ordinary wharfage in commerce and this salvage operation was something different.

In re Dep’t of Public Parks, 53 Hun 280, 25 N.Y. St. Rep. 9, 6 N.Y.S. 750 (App. Div. 1^st Dep’t 1889). Court affirms the report of the “Commissioners of Estimate and Assessment” making awards to owners of lands taken for Pelham Bay Park and other purposes except as specified in the opinion of the Court. The opinion deals with City Island Bridge and Pelham Bridge, among many other things.

Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. New Rochelle & Pelham Railroad Company, 57 Hun 376, 32 N. Y. St. Rep. 714, 10 N.Y.S. 810 (Sup. Ct. Gen. Term, 2^nd Dep’t 1890). The New Rochelle & Pelham Railroad Company was formed to build a street railroad in New Rochelle and a branch line in Pelham. The Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company brought an action to foreclose on the mortgage the company gave to secure a series of its bonds. New Rochelle moved to be made a party defendant based on a $10,000 bond that it required the Company to give to secure the conditions imposed by New Rochelle on construction of the street railroad. The Court below denied New Rochelle’s motion. On this appeal, the Court affirmed the lower Court.

Ellis v. Mayor, Etc., of the City of New York, 58 Hun 603, 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 794, 11 N.Y.S. 394 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 1^st Dep’t 1890). The Court affirms the lower Court’s dismissal of a complaint by the owner of property taken by the City of New York for inclusion within Pelham Bay Park.

Flanagan v. New York & New Haven Railroad Co., 55 Hun 611, 29 N.Y. St. Rep. 543, 8 N.Y.S. 744 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 2d Dep’t 1890). After a train stopped for such a short time at the Pelhamville train station that passengers could scarcely get off before the train started again, an injured passenger named Cornelius F. Flanagan was found lying midst his packages by the tracks. He died. His wife who was also his administratrix sued the railroad seeking damages for the death of her husband. The jury rendered a verdict for the Administratrix and the railroad appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the Administratrix offered sufficient evidence below from which the jury could infer that the railroad failed to exercise due care and that the accident was caused by the sudden start of the train.

Kaliski v. Pelham Park R.R. Co., 20 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 315, 15 N.Y.S. 519 (Ct. Common Pleas of N.Y. City & Co. 1891). In an action against a streetcar company for injuries to the plaintiff when the car overturned, the plaintiff sought $1,000 in damages, but recovered only $40. When the clerk refused to award the defendant his “full costs” of defending the action because the plaintiff recovered less than $50 (pursuant to the terms of an applicable statute), the defendant made a motion to the Court which then granted his request for full costs.

De Lancey v. Peipgras, et al., 63 Hun 169, 45 N. Y. St. Rep. 41, 17 N.Y.S. 681 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 2d Dep’t 1892). Plaintiff and defendant John Hunter recovered from the appellant in an ejectment action a strip of land under water adjacent to City Island. The Court granted judgment for them and denied a request for a new trial. Piepgras appealed and the intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision.

Elting v. Town of East Chester, 50 F. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1892). The Elting was a coal barge that traveled up the Eastchester Creek (Hutchinson River) to deliver coal at the Town of Eastchester dock. When it arrived, three other barges were moored to the wharf. It moored at high water to the outside barge. When the tide departed, the Elting rested on an uneven stream bed. Consequently, when the tide flowed again, the barge leaked. In a Libel for damages the Court held that the Town was not required to dredge the stream bed to keep it level and, thus, was not liable for damages.

The Una (Ackerman v. The Una, et al.), 56 F. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1893). This action in admiralty involved a libelant, J. Fred Ackerman, who purchased at a trustee’s sale a damaged yacht lying in the shipyard of John P. Hawkins of City Island in the Town of Pelham. Ackerman and Hawkins agreed the yacht would remain in the shipyard during winter, but would be launched by a certain time in spring. After disputes over the price of proposed repair work arose, Ackerman filed the action to recover the vessel. The court ruled that Hawkins intentionally obstructed Ackerman’s efforts to obtain possession of his yacht. The court held that the right to return of the vessel at an appropriate time was a right incident to the bailment of the yacht and, thus, damages of $8 per day would have to be paid until it was launched.

Village of Pelham Manor v. New Rochelle Water Co., 67 Hun 98, 51 N.Y. St. Rep. 369, 21 N.Y.S. 1110 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 2^nd Dep’t 1893). Water company sought to lay water pipes beneath Boston Post Road through the Village of Pelham Manor to supply water to New Rochelle. Pelham Manor sought an injunction saying the company did not have its consent. Following judgment dismissing the action, the Village appealed. The Court held that under the applicable statute, the consent of the Village of Pelham Manor was not required and the pipes could be laid by the company.

De Lancey v. Peipgras, 93 Sickels 26, 138 N.Y. 26, 33 N.E. 822 (N.Y. 1893). In action where the plaintiff and defendant John Hunter recovered from the appellant in an ejectment action a strip of land under water adjacent to City Island, the appellant sought to overturn the lower court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment though it modified it by inserting a proviso and reservation contained in the original City Island patent issued to Benjamin Palmer.

Piepgras v. Edmunds, 23 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 241, 5 Misc. 314, 31 Abb. N. Cas. 39, 25 N.Y.S. 961 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1893). The plaintiff had a shipyard on City Island and was “ejected” from lands under the waters surrounding City Island where he had a dock and rails used to haul ships out of the water following a lawsuit filed by Elizabeth De Lancey, John Hunter, Jr. and others. On appeal of that ejectment action, the New York Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the court below saying that it should have recognized certain easements provided in the English Crown’s original land grant to Benjamin Palmer in 1763. The plaintiff filed this action against the lawyer for John Hunter, Jr., Walter D. Edmunds, and John Hunter, Jr. He claimed that because they had the Sheriff “eject” him from using the land under the water using process that did not adequately reflect the modification made to the judgment by the New York Court of Appeals, his business had been shut down unnecessarily and he was entitled to $15,000 in damages. The court rejected his claims and dismissed his complaint.

De Lancey v. Piepgras, 73 Hun 608, 56 N. Y. St. Rep. 181, 56 N. Y. St. Rep. 736, 26 N.Y.S. 807 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term 2d Dep’t 1893). Following lengthy litigation to have Henry Piepgras “ejected” from land beneath the waters surrounding City Island that he used for a dock and ship rails to support his shipwright business, the Courts finally held that he could be excluded from such land beneath the water. Elizabeth De Lancey erected a structure to shelter employees to guard against use of the land beneath the water. Piepgras made violent threats, then removed De Lancey’s structure, throwing it into Long Island Sound. De Lancey brought this action against Piepgras and the court below entered an order directing Piepgras to restore possession of the land beneath the water to De Lancey and to cease and desist from interfering with her enforcement of the execution of the judgment in the earlier action allowing her to take possession of the land beneath the water. The appellate court affirmed the decision.

Iselin v. Starin, 71 Hun 164, 54 N.Y. St. Rep. 357, 24 N.Y.S. 748 (Sup. Ct. Gen. Term, 2^nd Dep’t 1893). Adrian Iselin brought an action against John H. Starin to block him from using a ferry dock on Iselin’s premises and a road over those premises leading to the dock. Starin filed an equitable counterclaim seeking removal of obstructions that had been placed on the road leading to the dock. Starin appealed a lower court decision in favor of Iselin. This Court reversed the decision, ruling in favor of John H. Starin and holding that after a review of the historical evidence, the roadway was dedicated as a public road. The true matter at issue seems to be that as the popularity of Glen Island soared and visitors flooded the grounds, Iselin became unhappy with their use of the roadway.

People Ex Rel. Donlon v. Board of Town Auditors of Town of Pelham, 74 Hun 83, 56 N.Y. St. Rep. 167, 26 N.Y.S. 122 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 2^nd Dep’t 1893). Court rejects appeal by three of Pelham’s Highway Commissioners who sought reversal of decision by the Board of Town Auditors of the Town of Pelham. That Board, when presented with invoices from the Commissioners seeking payment of $1.50 per day for each day they said they worked on the highways, conducted a hearing and rejected their claims finding that they performed no work on the highways at the times indicated in their invoices. The Court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the bills were falsely prepared and finding that, in any event, there was a fatal jurisdictional defect in the way the matter was brought forward for appeal.

The Lurline (Hawkins v. The Lurline), 55 F. 422 (2d Cir. 1893). City Island shipwright John P. Hawkins filed a libel against the steam yacht Lurline to enforce a lien for repairs. The owner of the yacht appealed from a decision in favor of Hawkins. The Second Circuit found that “the facts discredit the truthfulness” of Hawkins’ bills and that because Hawkins would not provide sufficient support for the bills at trial, his recovery would be limited to the amount offered by the owner of the steam yacht to settle the bill before the lawsuit began.

The Vandal (Milliken v. The Vandal) and The W. A. Levering (Stanton v. The W. A. Levering), 59 F. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1894). The tug Levering towed the steam yacht from City Island to the junction of the East and North rivers. While the tug tried to receive payment for its service from the end of a pole, the two ships collided. The owner of the yacht filed a libel against the tug seeking payment for the damage to the yacht. The owner of the tug filed a cross-libel seeking payment for damage to the tug. The Court found that the tug caused the accident and ordered it to pay damages. The Court dismissed the cross-libel against the yacht.

Village of Pelham Manor v. New Rochelle Water Co., 98 Sickels 532, 143 N.Y. 532, 38 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1894). Water company sought to lay water pipes beneath Boston Post Road through the Village of Pelham Manor to supply water to New Rochelle. Pelham Manor sought an injunction saying the company did not have its consent. Following judgment dismissing the action, the Village appealed. The Court held that under the applicable statute, the consent of the Village of Pelham Manor was not required and the pipes could be laid by the company. The New York Court of Appeals, the State’s highest Court, affirmed this intermediate appellate decision.

Broadway Sav. Inst. of City of New York v. Town of Pelham, 83 Hun 96, 63 N.Y. St. Rep. 814, 31 N.Y.S. 402 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 2d Dep’t 1894). This action resulted from forgeries and thefts by Pelham Town Supervisor Sherman T. Pell who stole monies and fled, never to be captured. The Broadway Savings Institution bought certificates of indebtedness from the Town of Pelham. The certificates had been forged by Town Supervisor Sherman Pell. The Savings Institution sued the Town to recover the amounts paid for the certificates. At trial, the Court precluded the Town of Pelham from offering evidence to support its defenses and directed a verdict in favor of the Savings Institution. The Town appealed. The appellate court reversed the decision and ordered a new trial on the claims, holding that information that would have shown that the certificates were fraudulently issued was publicly available and should have been reviewed by the Savings Institution as part of its due diligence, thereby making the evidence offered by the Town but excluded by the Court below relevant.

Standen v. Brown, 83 Hun 610, 64 N.Y. St. Rep. 170, 31 N.Y.S. 535 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 1^st Dep’t 1894). William T. Standen developed Chester Park in Pelham. This case sheds light on the finances underlying that development. Standen assigned “Bonds and Mortgages” he received from purchasers of Chester Park properties as well as three shares of stock in the Pelhamville Land & Homestead Association to Col. William L. Brown as “collateral security” in exchange for lump sum payments from Col. Brown and a promise to repay the lump sum payments a year later with interest. Standen later argued that the transactions should be cancelled as “usurious” loans. A lower court ruled against him, holding that the transactions were not loans but, rather, sales of the Bonds and Mortgages. The appellate court affirmed.

The Hattie Palmer (Hawkins v. The Hattie Palmer), 63 F. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1894). The ship The Hattie Palmer carried materials for City Island shipwright John P. Hawkins. It tried to deliver them to the dock near his business two days in a row, but no one was there to receive the goods and there was no place to store them. After the second attempt, Hawkins libeled the vessel, claiming a conversion of the goods and caused the arrest of the ship to prevent one of its regular trips. The Court dismissed the libel finding that Hawkins willfully avoided receipt of the goods so he could have the vessel seized to injure the ship owner’s business. It noted “if it were appropriate to such a case, I should charge the libelant with the special damages caused by his arrest and detention of the ship”.

Village of Pelham Manor v. New Rochelle Water Co., 39 N.E. 859 (N.Y. 1895). The New York Court of Appeals denies the Village of Pelham Manor’s motion for reargument of the decision reported in Village of Pelham Manor v. New Rochelle Water Co., 98 Sickels 532, 143 N.Y. 532, 38 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1894).

Standen v. New Rochelle Water Co., 91 Hun 272, 71 N.Y. St. Rep. 107, 36 N.Y.S. 92 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, 2d Dep’t 1895). Elizabeth G. Standen, whose husband developed Chester Park in Pelham, brought an action against the New Rochelle Water Company to enjoin it from obstructing the flow of the Hutchinson River after it placed a dam on the river to collect water to permit it to supply New Rochelle with drinking water. The dam reduced the flow of the river so that it often was dry on her lands below the dam. She also sought damages for the past deprivation of water. The Court below dismissed her complaint on the merits and awarded judgment in favor of the New Rochelle Water Co. Standen appealed and the Appellate Division reversed the judgment, ordered a new trial and held that the law was well settled that she could not be deprived of the use of the water as she was accustomed to use it.

The Hattie Palmer (Hawkins v. Davis), 68 F. 380, 15 C. C. A. 479 (2d Cir. 1895). In a libel brought by City Island shipwright John P. Hawkins against the steamboat Hattie Palmer, the Court below held that the steamboat had not converted goods it was supposed to deliver to Hawkins. Rather, according to the Court, Hawkins failed to be present to accept delivery, then filed a libel to cause a seizure of the ship to injure its owner’s business. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and awarded the steamboat owner costs, saying that a “Court of admiralty, like courts of equity, should visit costs upon suitors who resort to their jurisdiction merely to gratify a taste for vexatious litigation.”

Broadway Sav. Inst. of City of New York v. Town of Pelham, 2 E.H. Smith 737, 148 N.Y. 737, 42 N.E. 722 (N.Y. 1896). In a dispute over whether Pelham could be required to repay a Savings Institution the monies it spent to buy forged “certificates of indebtedness” created by Town Supervisor Sherman T. Pell who absconded with the funds, the New York Court of Appeals denied an unidentified motion without issuing an opinion.